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Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues
to Medical Science
I. INTRODUCUION

On December 3, 1967, the first human heart transplant was performed by Dr. Christian Barnard in Capetown, South Africa.' Although the achievement received a great deal of attention, it is clear
that its principal import is in the perfection of new surgical techniques, rather than in conceptual innovation. Organ transplants have
been performed for many years, from the simplest, a blood transfusion,
to more complex and hazardous therapeutics, such as skin grafts and
kidney transplants. 2 Anatomically, the heart is no more important
or necessary an organ than the kidney or the liver, but common
subjective notions of the heart's central function have led to greater
fanfare over the recent spate of heart transplants following Dr.
Barnard's feat than has met earlier surgical firsts.3 Underlining the
legal and ethical problems in any transplant situation, however, is
the fact that the heart, to a greater degree than any other organ so
far transplanted, must be removed from the donor within a few
minutes after death; and unlike the effect upon the recipient of a
blood transfusion, removal of the transplant recipient's damaged
heart ensures his death if the operation is unsuccessful.
The legal and ethical problems are evident. Given the fame which
follows this untried form of4 therapy, a doctor may be accused of
"experimenting" on a patient. Further, since the donated heart must
be "alive" at the time of the transplant, the question may arise as to
when the donor is sufficiently "dead" to allow removal of the organ.
Finally, given the disparity between supply and demand, when a
heart does become available, the question arises as to which of the
demanding patients is to receive it.
Senator Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.) recently called for the
creation of a congressional commission to study the various legal and
ethical problems raised by heart transplants.5 James Reston, echoing
Mondale's concern, summarizes the most compelling issues:
Whose life is to be saved through the miracle of another human heartthe rich man who can afford such prolonged expensive surgery or any
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 2.
2. M. WOODUFF, THE TAANSPLANTATION OF TissuEs AND ORGANS (1960); Couch,
Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation, 271 Nmv ENG. J.
MEDicnqE 691 (1964); Vestal, Taber & Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue

Homotransplantation,18 U. DEr. L.J. 271 (1955).
3. The Ethics of Transplants,The National Observer, Jan. 22, 1968, at 22.
4. Id.
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1968, § A, at 26, col. 3.
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poor man who happens to be around when another heart is available? Is

the man or woman of special talent to be saved before some other ordinary
mortal, and who is to play God with such momentous questions?
Lacking some kind of standards to deal with these issues of life and
death, it is not difficult to imagine situations more ghoulish than the grave
robbings of the early days of medical science. Can a hopeless man in
desperate financial straits agree to sell his heart to somebody else? Without

standards, even a black market in the human body is not entirely beyond
imagination. 6

These problems are obviously not new, but they have been emphasized by the dramatic quality of heart transplantation. Further, they
are only a part of a much greater problem. As medical research
advances, both cadavers and live organs will be in increasingly greater
demand. Lest press and commentators seem alarmists, a review of
the present state of the law in these areas should suffice to show the
need for drastic reform. The law is far behind the problems produced
by medical innovation; and most statutory and judicial authority is
yet unable to cope with the disposition of cadavers, much less donation of live organs, definitions of death, or allocation of available
organs. In general, the existing law in respect to the disposition of
cadavers has concentrated only on the most basic problems, seeking
to accommodate the sometimes conflicting policies of following the
wishes of the deceased, following the wishes of the surviving spouse
and next of kin, and making available sufficient cadaver material to
train doctors, conduct research, and transplant healthy tissue into
bodies needing repair.7 The law should provide the solution for
these conflicts; yet even though these conflicts pertain for the most
part only to the dead and the law of the living is practically nonexistent, the methods of the former may illuminate the paths that
should be followed by the latter. This note will review some of the
major problem areas, suggest needed reforms, and outline current
progress toward that end.
II. BACKGROUND:

ANATOMY AND AuToPsy LAWS

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries both medical and
legal science concentrated on the disposition of cadaver materials,
which were used for anatomical training in medical schools, and less
extensively for research.8 As the demand for cadaver material grew,
the law attempted, often within the confines of the common law, to
deal with the problems created.
6. Reston, Washington: The Legal and Ethical Side of the Heart Cases, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 12, 1968, § A, at 26, col. 3.
7. Note, Donation of Dead Bodies and Parts Thereof for Medical Use, 21 U. PrrT.
L. REv. 532, 534-35 (1960).
8. Comment, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, 19 Omo ST.
L.J. 455, 459-60 (1958). The research in the field of arterial transplantation with

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VeOL. 21

A. Anatomy Laws
Under the nineteenth century's limited demands for cadavers,

problems of adequate regulation and insurance of supply were met
by the anatomy laws, which provided that unclaimed bodies of
persons who died in public institutions could be given to medical
schools for anatomical studies. 9 This solution fairly adequately met
the several competing policies, in effect then and now, that (1) the
wishes of the deceased should be followed; (2) under the common
law the wishes of the surviving spouse and next of kin should be
followed; and (3) public policy demanded that medical researchers
and educators be adequately supplied with cadavers in order to
promote scientific progress. These statutes also gained impetus from
a desire to halt the fairly frequent practice of grave robbing.10
Modem needs are ill met by these statutes. First, social legislation
provides burial funds for those not otherwise able to afford such
expenses, thus eliminating the primary reason for failure to claim
bodies of friends and relatives." Second, there are but few such
unclaimed bodies in any case, and the quantity has most likely declined while the demand has risen.12 Third, in nearly all the anatomy
laws there is a provision for a waiting period before the body may
be claimed, 13 thus seriously diminishing the body's utility for surgical
purposes, particularly when cadaver material, in order to be useful,
must often be removed within minutes after death. Fourth, the
anatomy laws may work to hinder efficient allocation of available
resources since many of the statutes provide that the cadaver must
go to a medical school within the state. 14 Finally, the body must be
returned for burial upon demand by a relative, a requirement particularly detrimental to the cause of transplantation, since the entire
body must be returned," in accordance with the common law quasiproperty rights of the next of kin in the body of the deceased. It is
obvious that the anatomy laws are of little or no value to the cause
of medical research, both because of their restrictions, and because of
the quantitative and qualitative demands of medical science.
which this comment is concerned laid the foundation for many later applications.
See also Vestal, Taber & Shoemaker, supra note 2.
9. For a compilation of state statutes, see Comment, supra note 8, App. I, at 475.
10. Comment, supra note 8, at 460.
11. Comment, supra note 8, at 462.
12. Comment, supra note 8, at 462.
13. The tissues and organs which are used for transplantation are classified as
"critical" and "noncritical." "Critical tissues are those whose usefulness depends upon
their viability, but whose viability is lost so rapidly at normal temperature that postmortem legal procedures, tissue procurement and transplantation must be completed in a
Noncritical tissues can be removed at leisure 'after death."
matter of minutes ....
Couch, Curran & Moore, supra note 2, at 691-92.
14. Comment, supra note 8, at 463-64.
15. Comment, supra note 8, at 463-64.
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B. Autopsy Laws
A second possible means of obtaining cadaver material is via the
autopsy laws. Autopsy is the "[djissection of a dead body for the
16
purpose of ascertaining the cause,* seat, or nature of a disease."
Case law suggests that the performance of an autopsy requires not
only the removal of internal parts, but also their replacement, excepting those parts retained for microscopic study.1'7 These decisions are
based upon the theory that the deceased has a right to burial intact
and that relatives have a right to possession of the whole body.'8 The
argument advanced for abandonment of this removal and replacement
requirement is that permanent removal is customary; hence any general authorization allowing autopsy should be presumed to permit the
permanent removal of internal organs.19 This argument is, however,
easily refuted, since in the autopsy situation the public is not sufficiently aware of non-replacement practices, and therefore cannot
be charged with such authorization."0
The autopsy statutes do not solve the removal and replacement
problem, since they are ordinarily not concerned with limitations
on the scope of autopsy. 21 Some statutes, however, might be judicially
construed to allow permanent removal of parts for transplantation
purposes through interpretation of two provisions. 22 First, autopsy
permission can be granted by the deceased, and the extent or nature
of the autopsy is not limited; and second, autopsy permission may
be granted by the surviving spouse or-next of kin 'for the purpose of
ascertaining the cause of death." These features might support such
a statutory construction, but this is unlikely, since the weight of
authority and policy lean to the contrary.2
Thus, due to judicial decree or statutory provision, autopsy is
generally not an effective means of supplying needed cadaver
material. 24 Even a statutory revision allowing permanent retention
of body parts would not make the autopsy any more feasible as a
source of supply for transplants since the operation is normally per16. B. MALOY, THE SIwPJLIED MEDICAL DIcTrONARY FoR LAwYERs 83 (3d ed.
1960).
17. In re Disinterment of Jarvis, 244 Iowa 1025, 58 N.W.2d 24 (1953).
18. See B. SHATREL & M. PLANT, Tmu LAW or MEDICAL PAcrxcE: 64- (1959);
Comment, supra note 8, at 465. See also 4 ARK. L. REv. 480 (1950).

19. Comment, supra note 8, at 465.
20. Comment, supranote 8, at 465.
21. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 141.35 (Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 35, §

1111 (1964).
22. Note, supra note 7, at 533.
23. See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
24. The cases, however, have not clearly decided the legality of taking tisue during
an autoposy for therapeutic benefit. See Vestal, Taber & Shoemaker, supra note 2, at
'
291.
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formed too long after death for the removed organ to be viable, and
thus useful.m
III. GirF
Gift appears to be the most feasible means of supplying medical
science with needed cadaver material. There are important common
law principles which complicate this method, but statutory modifications and an increased public awareness have alleviated some of the
problems. 26 However, the effectiveness of gifts of human tissue is
complicated by the developments in transplantation requiring that
cadaver material be removed and utilized almost immediately after
death; whereas cadavers used for anatomical study are not subject
to such use restrictions. These complexities will be developed more
fully below.
A. Common Law Gift
Under the English common law there were no property rights
in a dead body which would permit a gift.27 Initially this rule was
accepted by American 29courts,' but was soon rejected in favor of
"quasi-property" rights which include the right to possession for
purposes of burial,30 the right to recover damages for mutilation of a
dead body,3 ' the right to prescribe the manner and place of burial, 32
and the right to make a contract for an autopsy after death. 3 3 Courts

have not, however, for obvious policy reasons, extended these rights
25. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, § A, at 18, col. 3: "Seven persons in every 10, or
a projected 80 million Americans, say they would be willing to have their heart or
other vital organs donated to medical science upon their deaths, the Gallup poll
reported .. "
27. The English rule was developed from a dictum by Lord Coke, noted in P. JACKsoN, THE LAw oF CADAvErS 127 (2d ed. 1950), and clearly expressed in Williams v.
Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659 (1882). See also W EIMIANN, A Survey of the Law of
Dead Human Bodies, 73 BULL. OF THE NAT'L RmSARCH Cotmici. 21 (1929).
28. Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134 (1859).
29. The courts have reasoned that these rights arise from (1) the duty to bury the
deceased, Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904); and (2) the
deceased's right to a decent burial, Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 86 N.E.2d
335 (C.P. 1949). The'latter right is thought to have evolved from the influence of
Christian doctrine upon the ecclesiastical courts of England. Comment, supra note 8,
at 456.
30. Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872).
31. Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 243 Ky. 15, 47 S.W.2d 1004 (1932).
32. Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 159 Minn.
331, 199 N.W. 81 (1924); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904),
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872); Goldman v. Mollen, 168 Va.
345, 191 S.E. 627 (1937). In each of these cases the court decided who bad the
right to control the disposition of a dead body, thus presupposing the existence of
such a right.
33. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 69 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1934).
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to include full property rights such as the right to sell, trade, or
otherwise dispose of a body in a commercial manner.a The most
significant problem in this area concerns the persons in whom these
rights vest; most importantly, whether the right to prescribe the
disposition of the body vests in the deceased.
No case has specifically held that a person may control absolutely
the disposition of his own body. Thus, the deceased's rights must be
derived from the four common law "quasi-property" rights mentioned
above. Of these, only the right to control the manner and place of
burial and the right to contract for an autopsy are relevant, as the
others pertain to the survivors.
Several conflicting policies combine to limit the right to prescribe
the manner and place of burial. Thus, although the wishes of the
deceased are relevant, so too are the wishes of the surviving spouse
and next of kin, as well as the community's standards of propriety
and decency. In attempting to resolve conflicts among these policies,
35
courts generally look to such factors as the wish of the deceased,
his religious beliefs and convictions, 36 the emotional tie between the
deceased and an adverse claimant of the body,3 the relationship of
the parties before the court, the practicability of carrying out the wish
of the deceased8 and a judicial predisposition to disfavor reinter34. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891). Courts hesitated to
extend these rights in a dead body to include full property rights because of feared
abuses, such as collection for debts.
35. See, e.g., Cordts v. Cordts, 154 Kan. 354, 118 P.2d 556 (1941) (wish of deceased and emotional tie with defendants outweighed judicial opposition to reinterment
-priority not an issue, since plaintiff and defendants were children of deceased);
Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964) (wishes of deceased outweighed by impossibility of performance and emotional ties between plaintiff and
deceased); Johnston v. Marinus, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886) (wish of
deceased and greater emotional tie to husband given priority over brothers and sisters);
Herold v. Herold, 16 Ohio Dec. 303 (C.P. 1905) (wish of deceased outweighed by
strong emotional ties to wife as opposed to father); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041
(Tex. 1934) (wish of deceased outweighed priority of wife over executor since deceased and wife were estranged at time of death); Wright v. Harned, 163 S.W. 685
(Tex. 1914) (wife had priority over executor even though wife and deceased estranged
at time of death).
36. See, e.g., Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 159
Minn. 331, 199 N.W. 81 (1924); Scott v. Riley, 16 Phila. 106 (1883), for discussions
of weight to be attached to religious conviction of deceased.
37. See cases cited note 41 infra. The emotional tie element is nearly always
present, and given great weight, since it relates to the policy of protecting the feelings
of the survivors. But see Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041 (Tex. 1934), where father
was given priority over wife because wife and deceased were estranged at time of
death.
38. An influential factor when applicable is the impossibility or impracticability of
carrying out the wish of the deceased. In Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290, 198
A.2d 654 (1964), the deceased had donated her body to science and asked that she
not be buried. The gift was rejected, and the court ordered burial.
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ment.9 In utilizing such factors, the courts have developed a
balancing test in which each positive factor, that is, a factor coinciding with the wish of the deceased, is balanced against the negative
factors. Naturally, the weight to be given to each factor will vary
with the factual setting. For example, the religious conviction of
the deceased may weigh heavily where it was of subjective importance, while the same factor may be discounted where it appears
less intense. The emotional tie factor, particularly when offset by
the relationship of opposing parties factor, will be weighed not only
relative to community standards of decency and propriety,40 but also
in terms of a system of proprieties, favoring first the surviving spouse,
then next of kin, and finally the executor or administrator.
Several conclusions may be drawn from the cases noted. Where all
factors are marshalled in favor of one result, that result is likely to
follow. However, emotional factors, such as strong ties between the
parties and the deceased, religious beliefs, and the wishes of the
deceased are likely to be weighted more heavily than such non-emotional factors as a judicial predisposition against reinterment. Finally,
even though a majority of courts say that in the absence of testamentary disposition the survivors have some form of control over
the body, 41 the results are none the less likely to vary with the facts.
The second factor suggesting the deceased's right to control the
disposition of his body is his capacity to enter into a contract with an
insurer for an autopsy after death.4 Many courts have upheld the
validity of such agreements, reasoning that since this is an intentional
contract, it should not be avoided, and that it is in the interest of
justice to finalize and determine the cause of death. An autopsy
may be authorized also in workmen's compensation cases, even
against dissent by the survivors; and finally, public policy demands
the same in cases of suspicious circumstances surrounding death. This
latter authorization is contained in the 1954 Model Post-Mortem
Examinations Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
39. Cordts v. Cordts, 154 Kan. 354, 118 P.2d 556 (1941).
40. See cases cited note 41 infra. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1968, § A, at 26,
col. 3. There, a mortally wounded man's wife gave permission for her husband's
removal from Connecticut to New York as a possible heart donor. The superior court
judge granted leave to remove, provided no other member of the victim's family
objected. The victim's sister and mother both protested, and the judge refused to
consider the case further.
41. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285, 55 P. 906 (1899); Larson v. Chase,
47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Fox v. Gordon, 16 Phila. 185 (1883); Curlin v.
Curlin, 228 S.W. 602 (Tex. 1921); Wood v. Buttervorth & Sons, 65 Wash. 344, 118
P. 212 (1911).
42. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 69 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1934); Standard Ace.
Ins. Co. v. Rossi, 35 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1929); Schmeideke v. Travelers Ins. Co,, 30
F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Tex. 1940).
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Thus, although the deceased does have some control over the
disposition of his body under the comon law, the right is generally
limited to transitory dispositions which do not affect the survivors'
feelings so greatly as a permanent disposition such as a gift to science.
Moreover, even in jurisdictions which expressly authorize an antemortem gift by statute, some courts have indicated that such a gift
may be repudiated by the next of kin.43 Clearly, effective remedial
legislation must not only strive toward uniformity, but must also
insure a more nearly absolute power of disposition in the deceased.
B. Statutory Gift: Current Statutes
So far, forty-two states, the District of Columbia,45 and several
territories and foreign countries4 have adopted legislation permitting
ante-mortem donation to science of all or parts of the body. There
is, however, little uniformity among these statutes.47
1. Donative Authority.-Generally, the first section of the statutes
43. See Couch, Curran & Moore, supra note 2.
44. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 13.05.035 (1962) (eyes
only); A=u. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-841 et seq. (1956); Anx. STAT. ANN. § 82-406
et seq. (1960); CAL. HEALTr & SAFTY CODE § 7100 (West 1955); CoLO. REv. STAT.
AN. § 91-3-5 et seq. (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-139 (Supp. 1965); FLA.
STAT. AN. § 736-08 et seq. (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2001 et seq. (Supp. 1967)
(eyes only); HAWAI REv. LAws § 64-14 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1961); IN. ANN. STAT. § 6-510 et seq. (1967); IowA CODE ANN. §
142.12 (Supp. 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.352-56 (1963); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:2351-5 (1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2881 et seq. (1964) (eyes
only); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149 (1965); MAss. GrE. LAws ch. 113, § 7-10
(Acts 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523 (Supp. 1968); MI-N. STAT. ANN. § 525.18
(Supp. 1967); Miss. AcTs (1966), H.B. No. 1070; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.310, 194.190
(Supp. 1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 69-2311 et seq. (Supp. 1967); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-1339 et seq. (Supp. 1965); NEv. PEv. STAT. § 451.440 et seq. (1963); NJ.
REv. STAT. § 26:6-51 (1964) (eyes only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-1 et seq. (Supp.
1967); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 4201 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90216.1 et seq. (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06-01 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. tit.
63, § 105 et seq. (1964); On. REv. STAT. § 97.132 et seq. (1961); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 5001 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-42-1 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-701 (1962) (eyes only); S.D. CODE § 27.1302 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-601 et seq. (Supp. 1967); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1 (1960); VA.
CODE ANx. 32-364.1 (Supp. 1966); WAsrr. REv. CODE ANN. § 68.08.250 et seq.
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1967) (eyes only); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 155-06 (Supp. 1967).
45. D.C. CODE ANr. § 2-251 etseq. (Supp. 1966).
46. E.g., Ontario, STATS, 1962-63, ch. 59; United Kingdom, Human Tissues Act 1961,

P.R. LA-Ws ANN. tit. 18, § 722 et seq. (1961); France, Decree No. 472057 of Oct. 20,
1947, and Regulations of Jan. 26, 1948; Italy, Presidential Decree of September 3,

1965.
47. The following discussion will consider the statutes as an aggregate, rather than
dwelling upon the many considerable differences.
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establishes the general grant of authority48 to a person either to
dispose or to arrange for the disposition of his body,49 or to make a
gift of his bodyY' The former grant is considerably broader, although
it can easily be construed to permit only a gift. This would seem
more reasonable, since it will prevent possible abuses, such as attachment of the body for debt collection, ante-mortem sale under duress,
or the like.
Regardless of the language used in the general grant of power,
every state has sought to limit the authorization. One such limitation
is found in provisions concerning the purpose for which one may
donate his body. The use-oriented provision authorizes a person
to donate his body for the "advancement of medical science, or for
the replacement of diseased or worn out parts of other humans or
for the rehabilitation of human parts or other organs. "5 The purposeoriented provision authorizes a gift for the general purpose of furthering medical science.52 Finally, the institution-oriented provision authorizes a gift only to specifically enumerated medical or medically
related institutions.8 3 None of these is complete. The first may not
include anatomical study; the second does not specifically authorize
transplantations; and the third defines no explicit purposes at all,
while at the same time very possibly impeding efficient allocation of
resources. A carefully drawn statute would combine specificity with
flexibility, so as to authorize anatomical study, advancement of
medical research, experimentation, and transplantation, while simultaneously making provision for use wherever required in furthering
the policy of the statute.
The general grant of donative power vests only in certain persons,
either the deceased s or his survivors.55 Vesting of the donative power
in both classes would facilitate the purpose of the statute-increasing
the chance of donation. 6 However, provision should also be made
insuring that the survivors cannot overrule the wishes of the deceased,
whether he did or did not desire to donate his body.57
48.

ALA. CODE tit. 22, §

184(1) (1958); MicH.

STAT. ANN. §

14.523(1) (Supp.

1968).
49. An. STAT. ANN. § 82-408 (1960).
50. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523(1) (Supp. 1968).
51. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184(1) (1958).
52. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-1 (Supp. 1967).
53. Asaz. BEv. STAT. ANN. § 36-841 (1956).
54. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.2351 (1963).
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-2 (Supp. 1967).

56. The statute should define the priorities among survivors in whom the power
vests. A typical example is KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.354 (1963): "(a) the surviving
spouse, if any, and if none, (b) The person or persons who are entitled to the real
property of the deceased . . . and if none, (c) The person, agency, or institution, or
organization having the obligation to bury such body."
57. W. sH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.260 (1962).
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2. Execution of Gift.-State statutes generally demand certain formalities in drafting the instruments of donation. Four methods are provided among the statutes: by will,m by any written instrument, 59 by
an instrument executed as a deed,60 or by oral declaration. 61 Two
factors determine the degree of formality required-proof of donation
and ease of execution of the gift. For example, an instrument in the
form of a deed may be sufficient proof of donative intent, but may
be so inconvenient as to discourage donation.62 On the other hand,
an oral declaration provides simplicity, but creates problems, if proof
of donative intent becomes necessary. Thus, a simple written instrument6 3 expressing donative intent seems to provide an adequate solution, combining ease of formation with sufficiency of evidentiary
utility. A gift by will has the problems already mentioned concerning delay in the execution of the gift. Since speed is normally of the
essence if the gift is to be beneficial for transplantation or similar
purposes, a provision permitting the bypassing of probate is desirable.
Closely associated with the form of the instrument are the procedures required after the instrument has been executed. Some states
require filing in the district probate court,es while others require
filing with the donee6 5 or with the donee and a third party of the
,donor's choosing.66 Similar objections and compromise solutions
emerge from these possibilities. Filing with the probate court would
seem to place a greater burden on the donor, while filing only with
the donee could result in fraud or mistake. Thus, the third-mentioned
solution would seem to settle these objections. Remedial legislation
should here be explicit, so as to simplify problems of proof, yet also
seek to ease the burden upon the donor, thus encouraging donations.
The last limitation on the grant of donative power in the current
state statutes concerns the language required to evidence donative
intent. Most statutes require the donor's "clear intention" to be
shown.6 7 One state, however, requires substantial compliance with a
form set out in the statute.6 8 It would seem that since courts are
58. N.C. GEx. STAT. § 90-216.1 (1965).

59. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a) (2) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
60. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184(1) (1958).
61. ME. R y. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2881 (1964); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 71-1340 (Supp.
1965).
62. Requiring the donative instrument to be in the form of a deed could tend to
discourage donations, since it would require both the formalities of execution and
filing.
63. Most states require that the donative instrument be signed by the donor and
two competent witnesses. N.M. STAT. Am. § 12-11-3 (Supp. 1967).
64. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184(1) (1958).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-603 (Supp. 1967).

66. Id.
67. LA. tav. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353 (1963).
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149(b) & (e) (1965).
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not strangers to determination of intent in other cases, the donor's
"clear intent to make the gift" should suffice.
Generally the donative instrument does not state the point in time
at which the gift becomes effective. Statutory remedies are a
necessity in overcoming this problem. Since the body begins to decay
immediately upon death, the uses to which any organ may be put for
transplant purposes becomes correspondingly remote. Thus legislation should provide for immediate effectiveness of the gift upon the
death of the donor.6 9
3. Revocation.-Procedures should be made available to allow the
donor to revoke his prior exercise of donative power. The state
statutes typically require that the revocation of the gift be made in
0 Although this approach
the same form in which it was executed.Y
seems reasonable, a last moment change of mind by the donor may
make this procedure impossible to follow. Thus, it is questionable
whether the revocation should be in writing at all, or whether the
original donative instrument should be returned or destroyed. On
the other hand, if the purpose of the statute is to promote such
donations, it might be deemed wise to require equivalent formalities
for revocation, since the true intent of the donor might be better
measured by his state of mind when healthy, at the time of execution
of the gift, than at the time of a later causa mortis revocation. A
reasonable statutory compromise would be to require only a legally
sufficient revocation, leaving to the courts the determination of intent.
But even this raises the possibility of fatal delay during litigation.
The policy question regarding the donor's ease of revocation must be
resolved in light of the purpose of furthering such donations in a
setting in which speed is of the essence.
4. Conflicting Gifts.-In the case of the execution of conflicting
gifts-such as a gift of the whole body to one donee, and specific
organs to another, or gifts of the entire body to each of two doneesresolution must be statutory. The Connecticut statute, the only such
measure to deal with the problem, provides that in the former case,
69. it.. AN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a) (2) (Smith-Hurd 1961). Some states have
further clarified the issue by providing that a gift by will is effective immediately,
even though the will may never be offered into probate or may be declared void in
future proceedings. CAL. HEALTn & SAmv CODE § 7100 (West 1955). Other states
provide that a gift by will is effective immediately, without court order or survivors'
consent. LA. REv. STAT. ANN . § 17:2351 (1963).
70. Thus, an instrument filed in the probate court may be revoked only by filing
another instrument in the same court. TE-. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1(3)
(1960). Or an instrument filed with the donee may be revoked only by securing the
return of the instrument from the donee. MIcH. STAT. ANNt. § 14-523(5) (Supp.
1968).
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the gift of the whole body will prevail, 1 on the theory that greater
benefit will derive therefrom, while in the latter case, the last executed
gift prevails, because of probable intent of the donor and the theory
that the later donee will more likely be present to claim the gift.72
Uniform remedial legislation would be incomplete without a provision
to cover such contingencies.
5. Rights of Donee.-In any statutory scheme authorizing gifts of
human tissue, the rights, duties and liabilities of the donee and
survivors should be affirmatively defined. The donee, or his agent,
in order to make effective use of the gift, should be free from the
contests of survivors. This would seem to be a corollary of other
provisions in some state statutes,73 but rarely are the donee's rights
affirmatively defined. In addition, the donee's duties should be
enumerated. If the gift is only of an organ, rather than the entire
body, the donee's first duty is to use reasonable care in removal and
preservation of the remainder," since the body should be returned
to the survivors in a condition suitable for burial. The donee further
should not accept a gift with knowledge of effective revocation. 5
Further duties relating to the nature and quality of information that
a donee must give a live donor or a transplant recipient will be
discussed later in this note.
No state statute defines the donee's liability for a failure to act
in good faith in returning the body to the survivors in a condition
suitable for burial, for exceeding the terms of the donation, or for
accepting a donation with knowledge of revocation. It would appear,
however, that the donee would be liable in tort as if he had negligently performed an operation, or had exceeded the consent of a
patient. However, there are corollary difficulties regarding the characterization of such an action as arising in tort or as a matter of
decedent's estates, which complicates possible conflict of laws problems, to be'dealt with in more detail later. In any case, remedial
legislation should contain a definitive statement of liability consequences, so as to obviate judicial uncertainty.
6. Rights of Survivors.-Just as the donee's rights, duties and
liabilities should be defined, so should the survivors'. Survivors' rights
include: (1) the right to possession of the body after the terms 6f
71.

CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-139(c) (b) (Supp. 1965).

72. CoNN. GEm. STAT. REv. § 19-139(c) (d) (Supp. 1965).
73. This right may be inferred from the provisions relating to immediate effectiveness
of the gift, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a) (2) (Smith-Hurd 1961) and the penalty
for interference with the donation, Ara. STAT. ANN. § 82-410 (1960).
74. This duty is positively defined in some statutes, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. §
14.523(4) (Supp. 1968).
75. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
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the donation have been fulfilled, in the case of a gift only of organs,
or in the case of a rejected gift;76 (2) the right to have the body
returned unmutilated, in the case of a gift only of organs; 7 and
(3) the right to perform last rites over the deceased, where time is
not of the essence 78 Where the gift will be disposed of to a medical
school or similar institution, and where time is of the essence, at least
one statute implies that the survivors have no right to possession of
the body.79 The survivors are under a duty to act faithfully and
promptly to fulfill the terms of the gift.80 This duty is imposed on
them since they will normally be the first to learn of the donor's
death, and should not be allowed to thwart the donor's wish and the
statutory policy of encouraging such gifts by failure to notify and
cooperate with the donee. Liability is imposed upon the survivors
for interference with the execution of the gift,8' where the survivor
does not act in good faith and has actual knowledge of the gift."' A
stricter standard, in conformity with the policy of the statutes to
encourage donation, could impose liability upon the survivor who
interferes with execution of the gift in the good faith belief that the
gift is invalid or nonexistent. The statutes defining the survivors'
liability83 are sufficiently stringent to demand compliance.
C. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws currently has under study a tentative draft of the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act. Drafted under the chairmanship of Professor E. Blythe
Stason, the statute is scheduled to be submitted to the state legislatures late in 1968." Many of the problems currently unsolved by
state statutes would be greatly mitigated by the adoption of this
statute, although in light of the special problems raised by the more
dramatic forms of transplant surgery, many will remain unsolved. 8
This section of the note will discuss the Uniform Act's solution to
the problems raised in the preceding discussion of current state
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-606 (Supp. 1967).
77. This right is corollary to the duty of the donee to use reasonable care. See text
accompanying note 74 supra.
78. MIca. STAT. ANN. § 14.523(4) (Supp. 1968).
79. This would seem to be the implication of TEN. CODE ANN. § 32-606 (Supp.
1967).
80. CAL. HEAFTH & SASmTr CODE § 7100 (West 1955).
81. Anx. STAT. ANN. § 82-410 (1960).
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-608 (Supp. 1966).
83. CoNN. GEN. STAT. RIV. § 19-139(c) (b) & (d) (Supp. 1965).
84. Lyons, Lawyers and Physicians Assess the Legal Obstacles to Organ Transplants,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, at 18, col. 6.
85. See Part V infra.
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statutes, reserving examination of broader social and ethical questions for a later treatment.
Beginning by defining various terms used in the statute, 6 the
Uniform Act clearly reflects encouragement of flexibility in adapting
to advances in medical science and administration of medical facilities. The most important provision is subsection 1(e), which defines
"licensed bank or storage facilities." Although not describing such
an institution in detail, the subsection's implication is that growth
in the transplant area will someday require such facilities, similar to
blood and eye banks, to meet growing needs.
As to competency to make a gift, the Uniform Act looks to state
law, requiring only that the ante-mortem donor be competent to
make a will. 87 However, the Act broadens the authority to make a

gift to include survivors, in the general order of intestate successors,
provided a contrary wish of the decedent has not been made known.8
In case of a controversy among the survivors, the Act provides that
the donee shall not accept the gift.8 9 However, this provision is
unclear, as it applies only to the situation in which there is a "controversy among the classes of relatives named," apparently abandoning the priorities in the grant of authority to ordered classes.
Donees and purposes for which the gift may be used are broadly
stated to include all medically-oriented research, therapeutic, and
educational facilities, without geographical limitation, and including
provision for future widespread use of central storage facilities. 0
The manner of execution of anatomical gifts is liberally defined in
the Act. The gift may be made by will, in which case it becomes
effective immediately upon the death of the donor, without awaiting
probate; 91 and even where the will is declared invalid, a gift acted
upon in good faith is none the less effective.92 A gift may also be
made by any other signed and attested document, delivery to the
donee not being required. Perhaps the most significant provision
of this section is that which allows the document to take the form of
a wallet-sized card to be carried on the donor's person,93 so that in
case of accidental mortal injury, or death far removed from the
domicile of survivors or donee, the gift may yet be "published," so
as further to effectuate the donor's intent. In such a case, or in the
86. UNnwoam¢ ANATOmiCAL G=-r AcT § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1968)
cited as UAGA].
87. UAGA § 2 (a).
88. UAGA § 2(b).
89. Id. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
90. UAGA §3.
91. UAGA § 4(a).
92. Id.
93. UAGA § 4(b).
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case where no particular donee has been named, the attending
physician at the donor's death is authorized to accept and utilize the
gift in his discretion as the "agent" of the donee. 4 Revocation of
gifts may be either by a writing delivered to a donee in possession
of a previously executed instrument of gift, or orally, or by dying
declaration to the attending physician, or by a card carried on the
of gift.95 A gift by will may be
person similar to the document
95
revoked in the usual manner.
The rights and duties of the donee give broad discretion as to
use of the gift, imposing only a duty of care in refraining from undue
mutilation in the case of a gift of less than the whole body. 7 The
donee is immunized from damage suits by any interested party if
his acceptance and use of a gift was in good faith and without actual
notice of revocation.98
The Uniform Act makes no provision for the situation in which
conflicting gifts are made to two or more donees, and although the
situation would no doubt be rare, it should be provided for, lest
adjudication cause delay and possibly render the gift valueless to
any party. It is questionable whether the other deficiencies in the
statute, to be discussed below, are properly remediable by legislation
at all.
In the overall statutory scheme, one further provision should be
noted: qualifying the rights of the donee, application of the Uniform
Act is expressly made conditional upon the operation of any state
statute prescribing the powers and duties with respect to autopsies.99
Although the state surely has an interest in determining the cause of
a donor's death where suspicious circumstances appear, such a provision could in the long run undermine the policies of the Act. Particularly is this true where the donor has died violently, and except
for a localized injury, has healthier organs than would be the case
if the entire body were adversely affected by disease. However, the
conflicting policies should probably be resolved in the manner set
out in the draft statute, lest the cause of justice be thwarted by
allowing a gift of evidence.
IV.

OTiE

LEGAL PROBLEMS

A. Conflict of Laws Problems

Adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act would relieve most of
94. UAGA § 4(c). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. 12-11-3 (Supp. 1965).
95. UAGA § 6(a).
96. UAGA § 6(c).
97. UAGA § 7(a).
98. UAGA § 7(b).
99. UAGA § 7(c). See also text accompanying note 40 supra.
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the conflicts difficulties presently felt in the area, since a uniform act,
except for inconsistent interpretations, is designed to standardize the
law. However, the Act is at present only in the tentative draft stage,

and until its adoption by all ffty states, conflicts are inevitable.
Such conflicts may be illustrated thus: suppose a resident of state
A has executed a gift of his body, valid under the donation statute
in effect in state A, and then dies in state B, which either has no

such statute and must rely on the common law, or has a donation
statute in effect which differs significantly in its terms from that of

state A. In either situation the question arises as to which state
law will apply to determine (1)

under the original hypothetical,

whether the gift will be given effect at all; or (2) under the variation,
whether the terms of the instrument will be given effect. Under

differing state conflict of laws rules, the same result would not be
reached in all courts, 100 since the intrinsic difficulty is compounded
by differing characterizations of the cause of action.

Traditionally, the law of the decedents domicile has controlled
in cases involving the disposition of the decedents property,1 " but
under the common law there is no property in a dead body.102 On
the other hand, conflicts rules often declare that a tort action is
governed by the law of the place of the tort. 03 Thus if the survivors
brought a tort action against a donee making use of the gift, the law

of state B would probably control. There is no case law in point,
although it would seem more reasonable to rely upon the decedents

estate analogy. This contention would be strengthened by the
existence of legislation in many states validating wills made in con-

formity with the laws of the place of execution.1 4 There remains
sufficient uncertainty to require uniform legislation.

100. Seven criteria have been suggested which a court should consider in determining
the choice of law. These are (1) the court should apply local law, unless there is a
compelling reason for not doing so; (2) the court should effectuate its own law;
(3) there should be certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; (4) the justified
expectation of the parties should be protected; (5) the court should apply the law
of the state which has the dominant interest in the outcome; (6) ease of determination;
and (7) the court should consider the fundamental policy of the law being dealt with.
Cheatham & Reese, Choice of Applicable Law, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 959 (1952). Thus,
for example, if the court of state B were to view the first factor with regard to the
original hypothetical, then a good reason for not applying local law is that the gift
was made in state A. If, however, the court in state A were viewing the same factor,
a good reason for not applying local law would be that the public policy of state B does
not favor such donations. Due to the varying approaches used by the courts and
varying weights given each factor mentioned, dissimilar results would likely occur.
101. See, e.g., RFSTATEMENT OF CoN"cT OF LAws § 468 (1934).
102. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., RESTATmEMNT OF CoN-Fncr OF LAws § 379 (1934).
104. E. CnEATHAr, E. Gmswom, W. REESE & M. ROSENBEmG, CASES AND MATEBIAis oN CoNr _cT OF LAws 704 n.2 (1964).
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Altering the preceding example, suppose that the donor is a resident of state B, but dies in state A. The survivors, probably also
residing in state B, may wish to sue under the common law of that
state. In this case, the results would presumably be less favorable
to the gift, and in any case would place an unreasonable burden on
the defendant surgeon in state A. In either hypothetical case, uncertainty may be resolved only by litigation, which may destroy the
efficacy of the gift where time is of the essence. Thus, model legislation such as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is required, not only
to further the policy of making such gifts, but to protect the medical
profession in carrying out this policy.
In a highly mobile society, a geographical problem related to the
conflicts issue involves the donor who travels, or moves to another
place. Existing statutes do not cover the problem of proof of donative intent in such a case, nor is provision made for utilization of a
gift outside the reasonable reach of a named donee. As noted, the
proposed Uniform Act solves this problem by authorizing a donor
to carry on his person a card evidencing proof of such intent." 5
Where a willing donor, having made a gift evidenced by a card to
a specific donee, dies in a place remote from that donee, the Act
provides for utilization of the gift to be made by the attending
physician in his discretion as agent for the donee.0 °
B. Consent
In addition to the consent of the donor presupposed by the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act and current state statutes, the problem arises
in other contexts. The state statutes and the Uniform Act deal with
gifts of all or parts of dead bodies. However, there are situations such
as kidney transplant operations in which very often the transplanted
organ comes from a living donor. The Uniform Act does not deal
with such a situation, and unless it is appropriately amended, the
common law will prevail. In addition, the transplant recipient must
give consent for an operation. In both cases, consent is required to
10 7
relieve the surgeon from liability.
Legally sufficient consent requires more than a mere written authorization; it must be permission intelligently given, based upon
the patient's understanding of the nature and extent of the operation
105. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
106. See note 94 supra.
107. Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954); C. STLTERr & A.
Moarrz, DOCTOR ANM PATWIE
AND = LANW 133-38 (1962); Comment, 4 U.C.L.A.L.

REv. 627 (1957).
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to be performed. 10 8 Consent is a limitation upon the surgeon as well
as an authorization. Under common law principles, the surgeon who
exceeds the consent given is liable in trespass. In order for consent
to be effective, the surgeon must disclose the procedures to be employed, the probable consequences of the operation, and the possible
alternatives, with their procedures and consequences. 1 9 In some
circumstances, however, the duty to disclose will be lessened, as
where the psychological frame of mind is such that too detailed a
description would be detrimental to the patient's health. 110 The
surgeon's duty to disclose consequences and alternatives to the patient
is dramatically accented in such situations as a heart transplant.
Removal of the recipient's heart insures his death, and therefore the
degree of certainty as to the understanding of the patient in giving
his consent requires a stricter standard of proof. To date there is
little doubt but that heart transplant recipients have not only given
consent, but have been otherwise terminal cases. But public inquiry
and concern is directed at the less dedicated practitioner, whose
desire for fame might persuade him to prescribe newsmaking therapy
when an alternative involving less risk to the patient was reasonably
feasible.
Thus, it is submitted that a higher standard of understanding in
giving consent should be required when surgery is required for the
transplant recipient or the living donor. Especially is this the case
with the living donor, for the surgeon is normally bound not to
operate on a patient unless the operation can be beneficial. However,
removal of a living donor's kidney clearly gives him no benefit. The
yet experimental nature of much transplantation therapy, and the
high risks involved demand a higher standard of medical conduct.
The cadaver donor, on the other hand, is sufficiently protected under
the existing statutes, or the proposed Uniform Act, for removal of
organs will be of little significance to the deceased.
The physician's concern for his patient's psychological frame of
mind should not mitigate his duty to disclose the consequences
where the transplantation is of a more experimental nature. Blood
transfusions, cornea transplants, or skin grafts would thus be subject
to one level of disclosure, while heart transplants would require a
higher standard. The surgeon should not be allowed to use his
patient as the subject of experimentation without informing the
patient of his purpose and obtaining his consent. Thus there would
108. Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957); Natanson v. Mine, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
109. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409-10, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
110. Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d
170, 181 (1957).
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be two levels of consent-the common law guide in all cases involving
donations, except those by a living donor and those by the transplant
recipient where the risk is great. A more stringent statutory standard
would apply in the excepted cases.
V. MEDIcAL AND ETmcAL PROBLEMS

A. The Moment of Death

Where a donor has made an ante mortem gift of his body or organs
to be effective upon his death, it is of critical significance to determine the exact moment of death. In the transplant situation, surgical
teams must be ready in advance, and critical organs such as the
kidney or heart must be removed within minutes to be usable.
Traditionally, legal death has been defined as the stoppage of
blood flow and the cessation of vital functions."' There is widespread opinion, however, that this definition may be medically outdated. Many authorities have suggested that a more realistic
definition could be cast in terms of brain damage."2 The appearance
of life may be maintained mechanically, even though the brain, being
irreversibly damaged, is incapable of supporting life; and "[a]fter all,
it is the brain that makes an individual human."" 3 Thus, these
authorities assert, by measuring the brain's activity it can be determined whether the possibility of life remains, since cerebral death
is the end of all life.
The encephalograph (EEG) can measure the brain's bioelectric
activity to determine whether death has occurred. Authorities generally list five criteria for determination of brain death by EEG:
(1) no spontaneous respiration for a minimum of 60 minutes; (2)
no reflex response .... No change in heart rate; (3) EEG: flat lines

with no rhythms in any leads for at least 60 minutes of continuous
recording; no EEG response to auditory or somatic stimuli or electrical
stimulation; (4) normal laboratory data including electrolyte pattern;
and (5) share responsibility for pronouncement of death with other

colleagues. 114
In a case involving a possible medical conflict of interest, the
EEG would remove the difficulty of deciding when and whether
111. Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958).
112. ". . . [C]erebral anoxia ends in death. . . . The completely anoxic brain ...
generates no valid encephalographic impulses. When such a condition has been clearly
established, it has also become apparent that the encephalograph can determine when
the loss of brain function is irreparable and implies an irreversible absence of
life . . . :' Hamlin, Life or Death bj EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112 (1964).
113. The Ethics of Transplants,The National Observer, Jan. 22, 1968, at 22, col. 4,
quoting Dr. Joseph E. Murray, surgeon at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston,
Massachusetts.
114. Hamlin, supranote 112, at 114.
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to give up use of such mechanical means of maintaining life as the
kidney machine. On the other hand, use of the EEG would allow
death to be declared while allowing the organs to be maintained
"alive" mechanically, so that the organs may be removed immediately
on cessation of bodily functions.
That this use of the EEG will facilitate donation of organs for
transplantation, is illustrated in In Re Potter, an unreported English
case.1 5 In that case the deceased was struck on the head during a
fight, and taken to a hospital, where he was connected to an artificial
respirator. A physician then gained consent from Potter's wife to
remove a kidney after a neurosurgeon had stated that the brain was
irreversibly damaged and that there was no possibility of life. The
kidney was removed, Potter was disconnected from the machine,
and his body ceased functioning. When was the moment of death?
If it was at the time of disconnection, then the kidney removal was
illegal, since the operation did not benefit the patient, the doctor
failed to obtain the patient's consent (he was still alive), and the
wife's consent was ineffective (her husband was still alive). However,
if the moment of death occurred at the time of the determination of
irreversible brain damage, then the wife's consent was effective, since
she had legal control over her husband's body; and the kidney removal
was legal. Donation can thus be facilitated by the use of the EEG
to determine death, since the survivors of an irreversibly comotose
patient may be willing to allow organ removal in order to save another's life.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act makes no attempt to define the
moment of death, and expresses no preference for a criterion for this
determination. In an area which approaches the frontiers of scientific
knowledge, it is surely wise for the legislature to refrain from action.
On the other hand, some regulation of possible abuses is required.
This is accomplished by section 7(a) of the proposed Uniform Act,
which provides for a division of responsibility, requiring the time of
death to be determined by the donor's physician in attendance, who
shall not be a member of the surgical team which transplants any
organ from the donor to another person. Presumably the attending
physician may use any method of determination he judges appropriate, and yet work in the best interests of his patient, rather than in
the interest of a successful transplantation.
B. Ethical Problems
1. Experimentation.-While the recent heart transplants have
received attention from the news media, they have also, worked to
115. The Times (London), July 26, 1963, at 9, col. 4.
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raise the hopes of many critically ill patients who, might be saved by
organ transplants, and have met enthusiastic public support and
sympathy. But the reaction has not all been favorable. Many
theologians, while approving transplantation on moral or doctrinal
grounds, have expressed concern with the medical profession's power
to play God."" The medical profession, too, has reacted strongly
in a few instances, arguing that so little is known as yet about the
scientific aspects of transplantation and the rejection phenomenon
that it is too soon to experiment on human subjects.
While it seems apparent that transplant recipients to date have
been otherwise terminal patients, the issues are none the less pressing
as regards the possibility of a surgeon's prescribing transplantation
when another, less dangerous therapy is available. Some medical
authority has called human heart transplantation "[u]nethical.
Medically unsound. Criminal."117 More responsible criticism adverts
to the "tremendous interest [that] has been built up in something...
that hasn't been proven." 8
While most medical authorities would agree that it is unethical
to experiment upon patients, there must sometime come the dividing
line between experimentation and utilization of a new technique. It
is submitted that in many respects heart transplantation is no more
remarkable than kidney or cornea transplantation, but has received
wider attention because of the traditional emotions surrounding the
layman's conception of the heart." 9 Seen thus objectively, heart
transplantation, in the early stages of development, is no more
deserving of adverse criticism than is blood transfusion, or the
use of a newly discovered drug.
The Uniform Act makes no provision for determining where
experimentation ends and utilization of a new technique begins. Like
the moment of death, this is an area on the fringes of medical knowledge, so far apparently responsibly used, and perhaps one best left
by the legislatures to the medical profession. On the other hand,
the analogy to drugs might suggest administrative regulation under
the auspices of an agency similar to the FDA. This has not been
suggested in the past, however, for techniques purely surgical in
nature, and it is submitted that such governmental control is inappropriate here, controls being best left to medical ethics. Nonetheless,
116. The Ethics of Transplants,supra note 113, at col. 6.
117. The Ethics of Transplants, supra note 113, at col. 1, quoting Dr. Werner
Forssman, chief surgeon of the Dusseldorf Evangelical Hospital, Dusseldorf, West
Germany.
118. The Ethics of Transplants, supra note 113, at col. 1, quoting Dr. Jay Ankeney,
surgeon at Western Reserve School of Medicine, Cleveland, Ohio.
119. "Whoever Tampers With the Heart Touches More Than Mere Muscle."
Subhead, The Ethics of Transplants, supra note 113.
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in a borderline area there is room for legitimate concern over hopes
raised by an apparently successful operation, only to be dashed by
the patient's death two weeks later. Yet much is gained from such a
case-knowledge by the medical profession, and two weeks of life
otherwise denied to the patient.
2. Allocation of Transplant Rlesources.-The question most often
raised in regard to the ethical problems of transplants concerns the
determination of who among many needy recipients will be favored
in a situation in which demand for organs, such as hearts, far exceeds
supply. Again, emotional conceptions of the heart have no doubt
had a strong influence in raising the issue, for the problem is not new,
and has accompanied not only the development of other transplant
techniques, but also the development of such mechanical devices as
the respirator and the artificial kidney. But the question is troubling
nonetheless, for the possibility of discrimination against the poor, the
old, or the unproductive in favor of the rich, the young, or the contributor to society is not difficult to imagine.uo Nor has any satisfactory remedy been suggested, such determinations so far having
been left to medical judgment. But as transplantation advances in
frequency and success, and as surgical teams qualified to perform
such operations proliferate, the question will become more pressing.
To the charge that the medical profession plays God, it is little con21
solation that diplomats, statesmen, and military men play God, too.

The Unfiform Act makes no provision for deciding such a case, and
the critical nature of the time element in any transplant situation
precludes a satisfactory result attained through litigation, even were
a standard available, or a judge more competent than a physician to
decide.
There is one possible legislative remedy, at best only partly satisfactory, which would entail the establishment of an administrative
tribunal, attached to the state, or to each hospital, under state or
hospital authority, which would be on call to make swift determination on that basis of whatever medical and other evidence was
available. It is doubtful whether an adversary system would be
appropriate, or even advocacy by the recipients' personal physicians.
Whether such an administrative tribunal should deliberate in secrecy,
or whether the prospective recipients' cases should be presented
anonymously, are questions that must be answered if a legislative
framework is to be capable of effective execution. Although an
impartial determination of recipients should be made, the charge of
playing God is not avoided, but is merely shifted to another. Cur120. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
121. The Ethiks of Transplants,supra note 113, at col 6.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

rently, such decisions seem to be made by the medical profession,
under standards not readily apparent, in the allocation of artificial
kidney machines and other such items in scarce supply. Surely the
medical profession would like as little outside intrusion as possible,"'
but as the entire supply and demand problem becomes more acute
some control is called for. Thus it would seem that one possible
solution would be an administrative tribunal composed of physicians,
with carefully thought out standards of admissibility of evidence on
behalf of prospective transplant recipients. So long as demand outpaces supply, decisions of this type will have to be made, and charges
of playing God will have to be faced. An arbitrary legislative standard to answer such questions would be difficult to imagine, since the
legislature would no doubt rather leave to administrative discretion
such decisions, rather than face their electorates with a law requiring
decisions to be made solely on the basis of age, number of dependents,
or the like.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medical research is currently in progress which may some day
make moot such problems, through perfection of workable artificial
organs or custom grown organs, raised and tailored to the requirements of a previously determined recipient in animal hosts. Until
these research goals are realized, however, some legislative reform
is obviously required. Adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
by the state legislatures will obviate most of the mechanical problems,
but serious thought should be begun toward solution of the broader
ethical and moral problems outlined above if the ends of medical
progress are to be accomplished efficiently.
122. The Ethics of Transplants,supra note 113, at col. 6.

